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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FEDERAL
REVIEW OF CRIMINAL TRIALS IN
STATE COURTS THROUGH DUE PRoc-
CESS.-[United States] The de-
fendants, seven negroes, were con-
victed of the rape of two white
girls, and were sentenced to death
in a trial conducted in a commumity
where public indignation and hos-
tility against the defendants were
so intense that it was necessary for
the militia to guard all the proceed-
ings. The convictions were affirmed
by the Alabama -Supreme Court:
224 Ala. 524. The defendants ap-
pealed from an order of the Ala-
bama court denying them a new
trial on the grounds that the orig-
inal trial was unfair and that there
was an insufficient representation of
counsel. The United States Su-
preme Court granted a writ of
certiorari and ther reversed the
case, holding that "the failure of
the trial court to make an effective
appointment of counsel was a denial
of due process within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment":
Powell v. Alabamna (1932) 77 L.
Ed. 78.
This decision has evoked a great
deal of comment both favorable and
unfavorable, the chief grounds for
disagreement, aside from the facts
of the case, being (1) that the de-
cision is an unprecedented invasion
of state criminal process, and a seri-
ous inroad on state sovereignty,
NEWMAN F. BAKER, Faculty Adviser
(2) that the result will be added
delay in the administration of crim-
inal justice, and (3) that it will
impose a great burden on the al-
ready overworked Supreme Court.
It is submitted that these juristic
and practical objections to the con-
clusions reached by the majority
opinion are not so formidable as
they appear at first sight, and that
the result reached, though consider-
ably widening the limits of the due
process clause, may be supported on
precedent and principle, and will
promote the best interests of Amer-
ican justice.
Federal interference with state
criminal justice is no novelty. The
two leading cases on the subject are
Frank v. Mangum (1915) 237 U. S.
309 35 Sup. Ct. 582, and Moore v.
Dempsey (1923) 261 U. S. 86, 43
Sup. Ct. 265. In both of these cases
it was claimed that the judge and
jury in the state trial court were so
intimidated by mob violence that
there was a denial of due process
under the Federal Constitution. In
the Frank case, after being denied a
writ of error by the United States
Supreme Court,.the defendant peti-
tioned the Federal District Court
for a writ of habeas corpus, which
was denied, and he appealed to the
Supreme Court. That court con-
ceded that due process of law is
denied to a person convicted by a
tribunal dominated by mob violence
without corrective process, but held
that the review by the state supreme
court was sufficient corrective proc-
cess, and on grounds of comity, the
decision of the Georgia court on
the facts, while not conclusive, wa3
entitled to great weight, and it
therefore affirmed the denial of
habeas corpus. In the Moore case,
after the United States Supreme
Court had denied the accused a writ
of certiorari, he petitioned the Fed-
eral District Court for a writ of
habeas corpus. The court sustained
a demurrer to his petition and he
appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court, which reversed the
District Court and ordered an in-
vestigation into the facts, thus
showing that the state supreme
court's review of the facts would
not prevent the federal courts from
taking jurisdiction. The two cases
may be easily distinguished, be-
cause the Frank case was an appeal
on the facts, and the Georgia high
court had held that the facts al-
leged by the defendants were un-
true, whereas in the Moore case
the appeal was on the sustaining
of the demurrer, and the Arkansas
court had made no ruling on the
truth of the facts, but had stated
that even if true, they did not show
the defendants had been denied a
fair trial. But it is generally be-
lieved that the Moore case over-
ruled the Frank case: Willoughby,
"The Constitutional Law of the
United States" (1929) 1717.
Thus the Moore case establishes
the principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment extends the right to
the accused in a state court trial to
have a free, fair, and impartial trial
at least so far as freedom from
mob coercion is concerned, and that
this right may be enforced in the
federal courts. Another case in
which the federal courts have inter-
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fered through the writ of habeas
corpus, which involved both mob
violence and insufficient repre-
sentation by counsel, is Dower v.
Dunaway (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) 53
F. (2d) 586.
Therefore the majority opinion,
though undoubtedly stretching due
process to a point hitherto un-
known, may be supported doctrin-
ally and on precedent. But in the
last analysis-the limits of the due
process clause being indefinable,
amorphic and one of the most ex-
pedient media of judicial rational-
ization-lack of precedent offers
little hindrance to even the widest
construction. "But apart from the
imminent risk of a failure to give
any definition which would be com-
prehensive . . . there is wisdom
in the ascertaining of the intent and
application of such an important
phase in the Federal Constitution
by the gradual process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion, as the
cases presented for decision shall
require": Davidson v. New Orleans
.(1877) 96 U. S. 97, 104. Realis-
tically speaking, due process means
"what the judiciary interprets it-to
mean, if counsel can persuade ac-
cordingly": - Albertsworth, "Con-
stitutional Casuistry" (1932) 27 Ill.
L. Rev. 264. Thus the due process
cases are decided primarily on judi-
cial statesmanship, and stare de-
cisis, or the lack of it, is subordin-
ated to the larger public interests.
Whether the court was justified in
this new encroachment into a sphere
hitherto enjoyed exclusively by the
states is debatable and depends on
the individual's political philosophy.
But evidently the court took into
consideration the notoriously unfair
trials given to negroes in mAny
cases in the South involving sex
crimes against white women and
the tendency of even the higher
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courts in some of the states to be
stampeded by public clamor, into
affirming doubtful trials. It is sig-
nificant that even an ardent states'
rights advocate like 'Mr. Justice
Brandeis felt that justice was para-
mount here, and it is safe to say
that Mr. Justice Holmes would
have done likewise.
The other objections to the ma-
jority decision, that it furnishes
new means of delay in criminal
cases, and that it puts another bur-
den on the Supreme Court, are of
great weight, but if justice is to be
more than a platitude, then due
process should assure a fair trial,
regardless of delay. Besides, the
delays which reviews by the United
States Supreme Court will occasion
through review of state criminal
trials under the due process clause
are more illusory than real. No
writ of error is available to the de-
fendant where the federal question
is denial of due process because of
an unfair trial, and it is clear that
review by certiorari will be granted
only where the trial is grossly un-
fair or is of exceptional public in-
terest. Similarly, the federal courts
are exceedingly reluctant to inter-
fere with state criminal process
through the writ of habeas corpus.
As Mr. Justice Holmes, who spoke
for the majority in the Moore case,
later said: "It must be realized
that it can be done only upon def-
initely and narrowly limited
grounds": Ashe v. United States
(1926) 270 U. S. 424, 46 Sup. Ct.
334. That the federal courts rarely
will interfere is shown also by the
fact that every attempt since Moore
v. Dempsey to claim federal protec-
tion on the ground that a convic-
tion in a state court was secured
through mob violence has proved
futile: Bard v. Chilton (C. C. A.
6th, 1927) 20 F. (2d) 906, certiorari
denied (1927) 275 U. S. 565; Dunn
v. Lyons (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) 23
F. (2d) 14, certiorari denied (1922)
276 U. S. 622; Ashe v. United
States, supra. Moreover, in the in-
stant case the court was careful to
limit its holding to a capital case
with the peculiar circumstances in-
volved here.
The added burden imposed upon
the Supreme Court by this decision
will not be very great, since in most
cases certiorari will be denied and
no opinion need be written. In-
deed, it is safe to say that one of
the main factors which has led the
court to refuse to interfere in cases
like Frank v. Mangum, supra, was
the fear of being overburdened with
writing opinions, since the defend-
ant at that time had a writ of right
in the writ of error. But the vari-
ous statutory changes substituting
review by a writ of grace, certi-
orari, has, released the Supreme
Court from this difficult adminis-
trative problem, and has enabled it
to take jurisdiction in cases like
the principal one, without danger of
overcongestion of its calendar.
The case is a striking illustration
of Judge Cardozo's theory as ex-
pounded in "The Nature of the
Judicial Process" of how non-jurls-
tic factors mold judicial opinion
(p. 12). Behind the surface lan-
guage of the decision, the analy-
tical student of the judicial process
can discern the conflicting elements
and heterogeneous viewpoints, so-
ciological, ethical, political, and the
force of crystallized public belief
in the innocence of the defendants,
which were the stimuli dictating
the result. The influence of the
aroused public opinion among liberal
thinkers throughout the country
that this was an outrageously un-
fair trial was probably the most
compelling influence on the per-
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sonnel of the court, and it was prob-
ably this intense interest in the case
which constituted "the special and
important reason" (Supreme Court
Rules, Rule 38) for which certiorari
was granted. What other factors
motivated the decision is at best
conjectural, but some of the more
likely ones may be suggested. The
Supreme Court originally inter-
preted the Fourteenth Amendment
as one enacted to protect the eman-
cipated negroes: Slaughter House
Case (1873) 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36,
81; and it is possible that the fact
that members of the race for which
it was enacted were on trial, had
its suggestive influence on the court
in this case. It is significant that
the other leading case of Federal
interference under due process, the
Moore case, also involved negroes.
Also the harsh penalty, death, given
the seven accused, coupled with the
doubtful nature of the evidence,
must have had its effect on the
humanitarian impulses of the court.
It is worthy of note that there was
a great deal of "radical" agitation
about this case and that the Wash-
ington police had a difficult time
restraining a crowd from staging a
demonstration in front of the Su-
preme Court while this opinion was
being read.
But the amazing part of the de-
cision is that the court departed
from. its established policy of re-
fusing to determine new constitu-
tional questions whenever it could
decide the case on any other ground.
The defendants' counsel in their
brief relied greatly on Moore v.
Dempsey, to which this case is
strikingly similar, and the majority
at the outset of the opinion quoted
Chief Justice Anderson of Alabama
to the effect that "the proceedings
from beginning to end took place
in an atmosphere of tense, hostile,
and excited public sentiment." Since
all the claims of the defendants
were properly raised, the court
easily could have settled the case
on the basis of Moore v. Dempsey.
Instead, as it hasj consistently done,
it refused to re-affirm the mob vio-
lence doctrine, and chose to turn
the case on the failure of the trial
court to make an effective appoint-
ment of counsel. Two explanations
for this most unusual procedure in
which the court went out of it way
to decide a new constitutional ques-
tion may be offered. One is that
the opinion represents a compromise
between the more conservative
members of the court who might
have refused to follow Moore v.
Dempsey, and the liberal members
who did not wish to jeopardize the
result they wanted by forcing the
issue on the mob violence formula.
This idea is suggested in Interna-
tional Juridical Association Bulletin,
October, 1932. This surmise is
strengthened by the fact that Mr.
Justice Holmes, the vigorous ex-
ponent of the doctrine of Moore v.
Dempsey, was no longer on the
bench, and Mr. Justice Sutherland,
who wrote the majority opinion in
the principal case, had dissented in
the Moore case, thereby making it
doubtful that the liberal group of
justices could have mustered enough
votes to decide the case on the basis
of the Moore holding. Another pos-
sibility is that the court wanted to
strike a blow at the vicious prac-
tice of rushing defendants through
rapid trials in which the right to
counsel and other constitutional
rightd are mere formal gestures,
and to open up a new avenue for





TION OF PRIOR RELATED Acrs.-[Il-
linois] The defendant, Varner
Corry, age fifteen, and three other
youths of about the same age broke
into the John Marshall High School
in Chicago on Memorial Day, 1931.
A janitress discovered their pres-
ence in the swimming pool of the
school and summoned police officer
Edward Francis Smith. The offi-
cer, in full uniform, entered the
tank room and commanded the boys
to dress. The defendant reached
for a revolver which he had placed
with his clothing and ordered the
officer to put up his hands. Smith,
who was about ten feet from the
defendant at the time, instead of
complying, jumped behind a pillar.
Shots followed, and in the exchange
the officer received wounds from
which he died. The defendant was
apprehended later in the day. He
confessed to having broken into the
high school two weeks previous and
stealing the fatal weapon from the
athletic department. He had pur-
chased cartridges for the revolver
and had practiced on an improvised
target range; he also admitted
carrying the weapon with him and
having reloaded it before his visit
to the school on Memorial Day.
The accused entered a plea of not
guilty and waived trial by jury.
The trial court, in sentencing him to
eighteen years for murder, re-
counted the theft of the revolver
and the purchase of cartridges.
Held: that the trial court had im-
properly considered the previous
acts in determining the measure of
punishment; case reversed and re-
manded for new trial: People v.
Corry (1932) 349 Ill. 122, 181 N. E.
603.
The acts of the defendant evince
a definite intention to use the re-
volver in the consummation of an
illegal act. From the apparently
bona fide confession it seems that
the defendant intended to meet op-
position even at the cost of taking
human life. This is a clear case
of murder-and even the Supreme
Court does not suggest otherwise-
and the evidence concerning the
theft of the revolver and the subse-
quent carrying of it is competent to
show an unlawful intent: People
v. Doody (1931) 343 Ill. 194, 175
N. E. 436; Nash v. Commonwealth
(1931) 240 Ky. 691, 42 S. W. (2d)
898; People v. Spaulding (1923)
309 Ill. 292, 304, 141 N. E. 196, 201;
People v. Johnson (1918) 286 Ill.
108, 121 N. E. 246. It is incon-
ceivable that the Supreme Court of
Illinois could deny that the acts of
the defendant were in direct con-
nection with the murder. The
causal connections between the
stealing of the gun, the practicing
with it, the carrying of it concealed
upon the defendant's person, the
breaking into the school for a sec-
ond time,_ armed, and finally the
resistance which resulted in the
homicide, are all so apparent as to
harbor little doubt.
The case was heard by the trial
judge without a jury, under the au-
thority of a recent case which
changed ani old Illinois rule that
had been in operation for over a
century: People v. Fisher (1930)
340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 743. The
purpose of the court in reversing
this case seems evident: it was to
instruct trial judges to be extremely
careful when hearing a case under
a plea of not guilty without trial
by jury. The -record must be en-
tirely free from error, for as the
Supreme Court says: "By waiving
his right to a trial by jury, the
plaintiff in error did not thereby
waive any other right" (p. 605).
The Supreme Court was a bit
injudicious, however, in its choice
of a case with which to discipline
and instruct trial judges. The
court, in probing into the mind of
trial Judge Sabath, has reached the
conclusion that he improperly con-
sidered the acts of the accused pre-
vious to the homicide in meting out
punishment. The court states, how-
ever, that "it was proper to show
that he [the defendant] obtained
the revolver and bought cartridges
suited to it as facts tending to es-
tablish the commission of the crime
charged . . . " (p. 604). This
means that Sabath, as judge, must
first pass upon the legal admissi-
bility of the evidence before sub-
mitting it to Sabath, as jury, for
in this case the trial judge acted
as both judge and jury. The evi-
dence was admissible to Sabath as
jury in order to show the commis-
sion of the crime as well as the in-
tent, but it was not admissible to
him in determining the amount of
punishment. The metaphysical dis-
tinction between the judge as judge
and the judge as jury is valuable
for purposes of interpretation, but
it is naive to suppose that-the judge
as jury can remain uninfluenced by
what the judge as judge experi-
ences. Granting that the judge act-
ing as jury took the previous acts
into consideration, it is impossible
for anyone extrinsic to the ego of
the judge himself to describe just
how the judge acting as jury was
affected. The Supreme Court ap-
pears a bit presumptive when it
states that "Apparently the offenses
which the court recounted were
taken into consideration in deter-
mining the punishment to be im-
posed" (p. 605). That the previous
acts were taken into account by the
court acting as jury is not denied;
but beyond the fact that the trial
court related these offenses in read-
RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
ing the sentence to the defendant,
there is nothing to indicate that the
trial court did take these offenses
into consideration in determining
the punishment. In fact, there is
strong evidence to the contrary. As
the Supreme Court states:
the punishment prescribed for that
crime [murder] is not uniform in
all cases but may vary within a
wide range" (p. 605). The range
within which the punishment varies
in Illinois is from fourteen years to
life imprisonment or death. As
previously stated, this was a case
of murder, admitted, at least tacitly,
by the Supreme Court in its opin-
ion. The only mitigating circum-
stance was the youthfulness of the
defendant. Yet with this wide
range of punishment in Illinois for
murder, the trial judge sentenced
the defendant to eighteen years in
the penitentiary, only four years
more than the minimum punishment
for murder provided by statute.
The Supreme Court decided, how-
ever, that the defendant had been
sentenced to his prejudice-that the
punishment was too severe.
The decision in the Corry case
probably will cause considerable
difficulty in future prosecutions;
gangsters and gunmen will demand
reversals upon the authority of a
reversal in the case of this fifteen
year old boy.
MARSHAL WIEDEL.
CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE MANN
Acr.-[United States] Jack Ge-
bardi alias Jack McGurn, and Louise
Rolfe were indicted for conspiring
to commit an offense against the
United States under sec. 88, title 18,
U. S. C. A. The alleged conspiracy
involved the violation of the White
Slave Traffic Act (Mann Act) sec.
397 ct seq., title 18, U. S. C. A.
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which imposes a penalty upon "any
person who shall knowingly trans-
port or cause to be transported, or
aid or assist in obtaining transporta-
tion for, or in transporting in in-
terstate or foreign commerce . . .
any woman or girl for the purpose
of prostitution or debauchery, or
for any other immoral purpose
.... " The evidence tended to
show that Gebardi, a married man,
and Louise Rolfe, an unmarried
woman, traveled by train from Chi-
cago to Miami, Florida, and that
Gebardi paid the hotel and rail ex-
pense, such trip being for an im-
moral pur'pose, namely, illicit sexual
relations. Subsequent trips to
Jacksonville, Florida, and Gulfport,
Mississippi, also were shown. The
indictment was laid under three
counts, each having as its object
one of the three trips for immoral
purposes. Both defendants waived
a jury trial. Held: Gebardi and
Rolfe were not guilty of conspiring
to violate the Mann Act because
the mere acquiescence of 'Rolfe to
make the alleged trips would not
make her a conspirator, and if she
was 'not guilty then clearly McGurn
was not, since one cannot conspire
with himself to commit an offense:
Gebardi v. United. States (1932)
286 U. S. 539, 53 S. Ct. 34.
The question involved is whether
the woman by merely consenting or
agreeing beforehand to make an in-
terstate trip for the purpose of hav-
ing illicit sexual relations with a
male companion may be convicted
of a conspiracy, with the man to
violate the Mann Act.
The trial court gave judgment of
conviction, which was affirmed by
*he Court of Appeals: (C. C. n.
7th 1932) 57 F. (2d) 617. Judge
Evans who wrote the majority
opinion of the latter court reasons
that "Credulity would be strained
beyond the cracking point to accept
as true the suggestion that said
parties met accidentally rather than
premeditately." In upholding the
conviction, the court relied upon the
authority of the following cases to
substantiate its view: U. S. v.
Holte (1915) 236 U. S. 140; Cor-
bett v. U. S. (C. C; A. 9th 1924)
299 F. 27; O'Leary and Sullivan v.
U. S. (C. C. A. 7th 1931) 53 F.
(2d) 956.
Mr. Justice Stone, delivering the
opinion of the Supreme Court, rea-
sons that there was no evidence
that Louise Rolfe purchased the
tickets or that she was the moving
spirit in conceiving or carrying, Out
the transportation, and that the
proof shows no more than that she
went willingly upon the journeys
for the purposes alleged. The fol-
lowing quotation taken from the
opinion epitomizes the reasons that
motivated the court in reversing the
conviction: "We perceive in the
failure of the 'Mann Act to con-
demn the woman's participation in
those transportations. which are ef-
fected with .her mere consent, evi-
dence- of an affirmative legislative
policy to leave her acquiescence
unpunished."
In the Holte case,- supra, the
court stated that under certain cir-
cumstances it would be possible for
a woman to be guilty of a violation
of the Mann Act and of a conspira-
cy to violate it as well. In support
of this statement, a hypothetical
case was suggested in which a pro-
fessional prostitute, as well able to
look out for herself as was the
man, suggested. and carried out a
,journey within the meaning of the
act, and even bought the railroad
tickets herself, all in 'the hope of
blackmailing the man. These ex-
ceptional circumstances envisaged
in that case are not present here,
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and the problem resolves itself into
one of whether mere consent to
make the alleged trips would make
the woman a conspirator.
As a necessary ingredient of the
commission of the substantive crime
by the man, the statute contemplates
the consent of the woman to make
the alleged trips in many cases, but
having this in mind Congress did
not provide for the punishment of
the woman because of her mere
consent, and it is extremely doubt-
ful whether it was intended that
she should be subjected to punish-
ment through the medium of the
conspiracy device. If we are to in-
fer that the mere acquiescence of
the woman transported was in-
tended to be condemned by the stat-
ute, the same reasoning would re-
sult in the inference that the pur-
chaser of liquor was to be regarded
as an abettor of the illegal sale, or
that the consent of an unmarried
person to adultery with a married
person, where the latter alone is
guilty of the substantive offense,
would render the former an abettor
or a co-conspirator. However,
these inferences have not been up-
held: U. S. v. Farrar (1929) 281
U. S. 624; In Re Cooper (1912)
162 Cal. 81, 121 Pac. 318.
It has been held that an agree-
ment to commit an offense may be
criminal though its purpose is to do
what- some of the conspirators may
be free to do alone, or that anyone
may plan that others shall do what
he cannot do himself: U. S. v.
Rabinowich (1915) 238 U. S. 78;
Tapack v. U. S. (C. C. A. 3d, 1915)
220 F. 445. On the other hand,
mere proof of the substantive crime,
as was shown in the present case,
will not alone serve to show a con-
spiracy to commit it: Biemer v. U.
S. (C. C. A. 7th, 1932) 54 F. (2d)
1045; U. S. v. Heitler (N. D. Il1.
1921) 274 F. 401.
Congress in enacting the law did
so with the express purpose in mind
of doing away with the interstate
traffic in women that was being
conducted for purposes of prostitu-
tion, debauchery, and other im-
moral motives. The statute itself
states that it shall be known as the
"White Slave Traffic Act." To
quote from Mr. Justice Lamar in
his dissenting opinion in the Holte
case, supra; "In giving itself such
a title, the statute specifically indi-
cates that while of right, woman
is not an object of merchandise or
traffic, yet for gain she has by some
been wrongfully made such for
purposes of prostitution . . . and
that trade Congress intended to bar
from interstate commerce." In
view of the ultimate aim of the act,
a prosecution of the woman for
conspiring to violate it seems con-
trary to its general intendment.
A practical consideration that
suggests itself is that in many cases
in order to convict those guilty of
a violation of the act itself, the
testimony of the woman transported
is the most potent evidence in pos-
session of the prosecution. If it
be held that the acquiescence of the
woman to make the trip would make
her a conspirator, she would then
be in a position to claim her priv-
ilege and refuse to testify on the
ground that she might thereby sub-
ject herself to a prosecution for
conspiracy.
Conceding that Louise Rolfe was
rnot guilty of conspiracy to violate
the Mann Act, it follows that Mc-
Gurn also was not guilty, because
one cannot conspire with himself
to violate an act, there being no evi-
dence that he conspired with any-
body else: W'illiams v. U. S. (C.
C. A. 4th, 1922) 282 F. 481.
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It is settled that commercialism
is not an essential to a violation
of the "White Slave Traffic Act":
Caminettl v. U. S. (1916) 242 U. S.
470. In non-commercial cases, al-
though they are technically within
the prohibitions of the statute, the
various district attorneys have
prosecuted such as in their own
discretion demand attention. As a
guide to the exercise of this dis-
cretion, cases involving previous
chaste, or very young women or
girls, or (when state laws are in-
adequate) involving married women
(with young children) then living
with their husbands, properly have
received consideration. The pres-
ent prosecution is a digression
from the previous policy in non-
commercial cases, since none of the
above factors were involved, but
the explanation can be found in the
facts leading to the indictment.
When McGurn was being ques-
tioned as to his alleged participa-
tion in the "St. Valentine's Day
Massacre" in Chicago, his alibi was
to the effect that he was out of the
state at the time with Rolfe. At-
tempted prosecutions by state au-
thorities were unsuccessful. The
Federal authorities then instigated
this prosecution using the Mann Act
violation as a means of sending
McGurn, a notorious character, to
the penitentiary.
The question arises as to why a
prosecution under a conspiracy in-
dictment was had rather than one
against Gebardi himself for the di-
rect violation of the act, there being
no particular reason why the woman
should be convicted. Two possible
motivating factors suggest them-
selves as an explanation. In the
first place, the evidence on the part
of the government was largely cir-
cumstantial and the chances of
proving a conspiracy charge pos-
sibly seemed greater, since more
evidence might be introduced under
conspiracy counts than under those
charging the substantive crime it-
self. This inference may be sup-
ported on the grounds that a con-
spiracy makes each conspirator
liable for the acts of every other
conspirator done in pursuance of
the conspiracy. Consequently, the
admissions and acts of a co-con-
spirator may be used to affect the
proof against the other. There-
fore, any acts or admissions made
by Louise Rolfe might be admis-
sible against McGurn: 2 Wigmore
"Evidence" (2d ed., 1923.) sec.
1079; Logan v. U. S. (1893) 144
U. S. 263, 12 S. Ct. 617; Brown v.
U. S. (1895) 150 U. S. 93, 14 S.
Ct. 37. Another possible advantage
of a conspiracy indictment involv-
ing both McGurn and Rolfe, the
latter having become his wife, is
the bargaining -possibilities it con-
tains. More, specifically, the gov-
ernment could 6ffer to nolle prosequi
the conspiracy indictment, thus let-
ting his wife go free if McGurn
would plead guilty to an indictment
that had been returned for the sub-
stantive offense.
At the present time, an indict-
ment is still pending against Mc-
Gum for the direct violation of the
act which calls for some comment
as to whether' he committed the
substantive crime. The interstate
transportation denounced by the act
must have for its object, or be a
means of effecting, or at least facili-
tating the illicit sexual relations of
the parties; but. the mere fact that
a journey from.one state to another
is followed by such intercourse un-
related to the journey itself, cannot
be regarded as a violation of the
statute-if it is only incidental to
the primary purpose of the trip:
the Caminetti case, supra; Van Pelt
v. United States (C. C. A. 4th,
1917) 240 Fed. 346. Taking into
consideration these interpretations
of the act that have been given,
there was evidence offered which
would tend to show that the trips
were made to facilitate illicit sexual
relations between the defendants,
thereby causing McGurn to be
guilty of a direct violation of the
act. However, it is not very likely
that the government will Subject
itself to the expense and trouble of
another prosecution, especially in
view of the fact that the defendants
are now married-which would
make it unlikely that a jury would
convict.
HAROLD KOVEN.
CouRTs-PowER To ADOPT AND
ENFORCE RULES.-[Illinois] A peti-
tion for a writ of mandamus was
filed by the Chicago Bar Associa-
tion as relator, praying that the re-
spondent be commanded to expunge
from the records of the Criminal
Court of Cook County certain or-
ders which he had assumed to enter
as a judge of the Criminal Court
of said county. Judge Feinberg,
the respondent, while in the chan-
cery branch of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, summoned and im-
panelled a special grand jury after
a petition had been presented to the
judges of the Circuit Court asking
that a political investigation be
made. Chief Justice Fisher of the
Criminal Court refused to recog-
nize this special grand jury because
the respondent at that time had not
been assigned to the Criminal Court,
and had no authority to impanel a
special grand jury and appoint a
special state's attorney to make such
an investigation. Chief Justice
Fisher directed the Clerk of the
Criminal Court not to fulfill the
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duties imposed upon him by Judge
Feinberg. On a hearing of the
petition, the court refused to issue
the mandamus. Held: that Judge
Feinberg, who had not been as-
signed to the Criminal Court and
who had made void orders respect-
ing the grand jury, was without
jurisdiction to expunge the orders
entered in the Criminal Court, and
he could not be compelled by man-
damus to expunge them: People
ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v.
Feinberg (1932) 348 Ill. 549, 181
N. E. 437.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in
giving this decision upheld the the-
ory that rules of court, such as had
been adopted by the Circuit and Su-
perior Courts of Cook County, are
binding on each of the judges, un-
less in a particular case for good
cause, they may be disregarded:
People v. Smith (1916) 275 Ill. 210,
113 N. E. 891. These rules must
be consistent with the law, and not
violate or contravene the constitu-
tion or statutes. The court declared
that no judge of the Circuit Court,
unless so assigned, had the right
to hold a term in the Criminal
Court: United States- Life Ins. Co.
v. Shattuck (1895) 159 III. 610, 43
N. E. 389. The case just cited is
directly contra to the principal one
relied upon by the respondent,
which held that the jurisdiction of
the Criminal Court of Cook Coun-
ty, in criminal and quasi-criminal
cases, is concurrent with the Cir-
cuit Court and not exclusive: .Ber-
kowitz v. Lester (1887) 121 Ill. 99,
11 N. E. 860. The court disposed
of the Berkowitz decision on the
grounds that it was a question of
constitutional interpretation, and
that the cases following the Bar-
kowitz rule failed to give a true
exposition of the constitutional
clauses involved. The Supreme
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Court declared that the Berkowitz
case was out of harmony with
United States Life Ins. Co. v. Shat-
tuck, supra, and the opinion was
overruled.
- Aside from the local importance
attached to this decision, it is 'pe-
culiarly significant as bearing upon
the power of courts to adopt and
to enforce their own rules and
regulations. The extent to which
courts may go in exercising this
power is a moot question, and the
limit to which they may proceed
has not met with universal appro-
bation.
In 1853 the old Recorder's Court
of the City of Chicago was estab-
lished by the state legislature: Laws
of Illinois, 1853, 147. For Re-
corder's Courts see: 3 Holdsworth
"History of English Law" (1924)
144; Sidney and Beatrice Webb
"English Lo c a I Government"
(1924) 321-358. When the Illinois
Constitution was revised in 1870,
the Recorder's Court was continued,
but called the Criminal Court of
Cook County: Illinois Constitu-
tion, 1870, Art. 6, sec. 26. By the
Act. of 1874, the Criminal Court had
conferred upon it exclusive orig-
inal jurisdiction of all criminal
cases in the County of Cook, ex-
cept as was conferred upon jus-
tices of the peace: Ill. Rev. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd, 1931) ch. 38, sec.
701. The judges who were to pre-
side in this court were required to
be selected from the judges of the
Circuit or Superior Court, as nearly
as might be in alternation, by the
choice of the whole number of
judges of the respective courts or
as might be provided by law. Said
judges were to be ex officio judges
of the court: Illinois Constitution,
1870, Art. 6, see. 26.
The general doctrine that courts
have the power to adopt rules for
their own procedure has been up-
held in many cases. A court has,
even in the absence of any statutory
provision or regulation in reference
thereto, inherent power to make
rules for the regulation of their
practice and conduct of their busi-
ness: Fullerton v. U. S. Bank
(1828) 1 Pet. (U. S.) 604; Mahr
v. Union Pac. R. R. Co. (1906)
140 Fed. 921; Ex parte Birmingham:
.(1902) 134 Ala. 609, 33 So. 13;
Hinckley v. Dean (1882) 104 Ill.
630; Gardner v. Butler (1906) 193
Mass. 96, 78 N. E. 885; Rigney v.
Rigney (1891) 127 N. Y. 408, 28
N. E. 405; Hilffrich v. Greenberg
(1903) 206 Pa. 516, 56 Atl. 45.
Such rules, however, must not be
contrary to the constitution and
laws of the state: Rooker v. Bruce
.(1908) 171 Ind. 86, 85 N. E. 357;
Gardner v. Butler, supra; In re
Evans (1913) 42 Utah 282, 130
Pac. 317; People v. Nichols (1880)
79 N. Y. 582; Van Ingen v. Berger
(1910) 82' Ohio St. 255, 92 N. E.
433; note, 19 Ann. Cas. 799; Steven-
son v. Milwaukee County (1909)
140 Wis. 14, 121 N. W. 654; State
v. Gideon (1893) 119 Mo. 94, 23
S. W. 748; Goodwin v. Bickford
(1901) 20 Okla. 91, 93 Pac. 548;
Zeuske v. Zeuske (1910) 55 Or. 65,
103 Pac. 648; Equipment Corp. of
America v. Primos Vanadium Co.
(1926) 285 Pa. 432, 132 Atl. 360.
In 1915 a set of rules was adopted
by the Circuit and Superior Courts
of Cook County, regulating their
procedure, the method of assign-
ment of judges to the criminal
court, and other matters relating to
their judicial activities. Judges
who were to sit in the Criminal
Court were to be designated by the
executive committee of each court,
from among the judges of the law
division of their respective courts,
as nearly as may be in rotation:
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Rules of Circuit and Superior Court
of Cook County, Rule 6. So far
as we know the judges elected to
these courts were aware of these
rules and abided by them; but
whether or not these rules were
known to them, the established prac-
tice of these courts, of which they
were cognizant, had the same effect
as a rule of court: The Semarainis
(E. D. N. Y., 1931) 50 F.- (2d)
623. Consequently, Judge Feinberg,
in summoning the special grand
jury at a time when he was not
assigned to the criminal branch of
the County Court, was usurping a
power which he did not possess.
The accepted theory is that rules of
court have the effect of laws, both
upon the judge and litigants: North
Ave. Bldg. Ass'n. v. Huber (1918)
286 Ill. 375, 121 N. E. 721; Axtell
v. Pulsifer (1895) 155 I1. 141, 39
N. E. 615; Weil v. Neary (1929)
278 U. S. 160, 40 Sup. Ct. 144.
Furthermore, the rules adopted by
a court have the effect of law as to
proceedings in such court: People
v. Andrus (1921) 299 II. 50, 132
N. E. 225; Golden v. McKim (1922)
45 Nev. 350, 204 Pac. 602; Ren-
frow v. Ittleson (1925) 110 Okla.
109, 236 Pac. 585; Clawans v.
Whiteford (1931) 60 App. D. C.
412, 55 F. (2d) 1037; U. S. v. Bar-
ber Lumber Co. (C- C. A. 9th, 1908)
169 Fed. 184. These rules cannot
be disregarded or set aside except
in the manner provided by the rules
themselves: Owens v. Ranstead
(1859) 22 Il1. 161.
The respondent, in the heat and
turmoil of a political campaign in
which he was vitally interested, im-
panelled his special grand jury,
thereby setting aside the court rule
pertaining to the assignment of
judges to the criminal court. A
court has no discretion to dispense
at pleasure with rules established
by it: Bratt v. State Industrial Ac-
cidcntal Commission (1925) 114
Or. 644, 236 Pac. 478. In another
jurisdiction it has been held that a
court ought not to depart from es-
tablished practice suddenly and
without notice: City of Detroit v.
Judge of Rccorder's Court (1931)
255 Mich. 44, 237 N. W. 40. A
course of action, such as that in-
dulged in by the respondent in sus-
pending fixed rules of the court of
which he was a member, may be
criticized on the theory that a rule
of a court cannot be dispensed with
to suit the circumstances of any
particular case: Clawans v. White-
ford, supra; Rio Grande Irrigation
Co. v. Gildersleeve (1899) 174 U.
S. 608, 198 Sup. Ct. 761. Without
the -adoption of rules by general
agreement, each judge would have
his own rules, and uncertainty and
confusion would result in practice:
Gage v. Eddy (1892) 167 Ill. 102,
47 N. E. 200.
The general trend of decisions
bearing upon the question of the
rule making power of courts is in
harmony with the views voiced by
many legal authorities in this field.
Each successive year the opinions
of these men carry a reverberating
note, advocating more freedom to
be given to the courts to prescribe
rules under which they shall oper-
ate. At the beginning of federal
statehood, it was the generally rec-
ognized policy of the state that the
legislature should formulate the
procedure and practice for the
courts. The fact remains, however,
that the making of such laws for
procedure and practice is in itself
an exclusive judicial function. There
is excellent authority, from an 1is-
torical as well as a legal stand-
point, that the making of these
rules is not at all a legislative but
purely a judicial function: Hay-
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burn's Case (1792) 2 Dali. (U. S.)
411. Chief Justice Marshall in 1825
stated that the line has not been
drawn exactly which separates
those important subjects, which
must be regulated entirely by the
legislature itself, and those in
which a provision is made for the
ones who work under rules to fill
in the details themselves: Waynan
v. Southward (1825) 10 Wheat. 1,
23 U. S. 1. Over a hundred years
later Professor Wigmore said that
the legislature exceeds its constitu-
tional power when it attempts to
impose upon the judiciary any rules
for the dispatch of the judiciary's
duties: Wiginore "All Legislative
Rules, for Judiciary Procedure are
Void Constitutionally" (1928) 23
II. L. Rev. 276, 277. Dean Pound
has declared that the power to gov-
ern procedure by general rules has
been regarded universally as part
of the judicial function, and hence,
as an inherent power of courts of
justice: Pound "Regulation of Ju-
dicial Procedure by Rules of Court"
.(1915) 10 Ill. L. Rev. 172.
The consensus of opinion appears
to be that matters of court procea-
ure should be placed in the hands
of those who are to work under
these rules. The judges are cer-
tainly better qualified by training
and experience, than any legislative
body, to formulate rules of proced-
ure. In order to obtain a more ef-
fective and uniform system, the
court should have the power to
adopt and enforce such rules as may
be best suited to that end: Hinton
"Court Rules for the Regulation of
Procedure in Federal Courts"
(1927) 13 A. B. A. Jour., Part 2,
8. The strong effort which is being
made by the legal profession of
the United States to place the regu-
lation of legal procedure under the
control of the courts has the double
purpose of saving the public from
the burden of an utterly inadequate
administration of justice, and of
rescuing the profession from the un-
deserved charge of responsibility
for that inadequacy: Sunderland
"Expert Control of Legal Proced-
ure Through Rules of Court"
(1927) 13 A. B. A. Jour., Part 2, 2.
The proponents of court-made
rules advance the following advan-
tages in support of their plan:
1. Control of details of Court
procedure calls for the exer-
cise of expert knowledge, and
best results can be derived by
utilizing the ability, knowl-
edge, experience and study of
judges and lawyers.
2. It would be possible to make
changes in rules at any time
by appealing to the court
which has the power to change
them.
3.. Judges would be responsive to
the necessary changes in prac-
tice.
4. Court rules would discourage
reliance on technical questions
of procedure to defeat substan-
tive rights.
5. It would tend to enlarge the
general respect for adminis-
tration of justice and elevate
both bench and bar in the es-
timation of the public.
Hudson "Why Confer Rule Mak-
ing Power on Courts?" U. of Mo.
Law Bul. Series 13, quoted in 7
Jour. of Am. Jud. Soy. (1924) 161.
ROGER R. CLOUSE.
PHOTOGRAPH S- ADmSSIILITY.-
[Rhode Island] The defendant was
indicted and convicted of murder in
the second degree for a killing com-
mitted during a prison riot. On
appeal, exceptions were taken to the
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admission of photographs showing
not only the bullet wounds on the
body of the deceased, but also the
entire body. It was argued that the
photographs would cause a feeling
of repulsion and would prejudice
the minds of the jury against the de-
fendant. Whether they were cor-
rect or genuine was not questioned.
Held: affirmed, on the ground that
photographs were competent to
prove the nature of the wounds,
the identity of the deceased, and
cause of the death: State v. Miller
.(R. I. 1932) 161 Atl. 222.
Photographs, like maps, diagrams,
and plats generally are admissible
on the ground that they are a wit-
ness's pictured expression of the
data observed by him. Thus they
take the place of words. Where it
is shown that they have been taken
accurately and represent the sub-
ject correctly, they are admissible
if they illuminate the mattef in
controversy: Simmons v. State
(1931) 184 Ark. 373, 42 S. W.
(2d) 549; comment (1930) 18 Ky.
L. Jour. 301. The competency of
photographs in evidence may be at-
tacked on three grounds: there may
be an objection, not to the photo-
graphic testimony as such, but to
the relevancy of the fact testified
to; there may be an objection to
the reproduction of a corporeal in-
jury or other object calculated un-
duly to excite sympathy for one
party; there may be an objection
that the photographs substantially
misrepresent the object: 2 Wig-
more "Evidence" (2d ed., 1923)
sec. 792. With the advent of new
improvements in photography, pho-
tographs have been used in innu-
merable instances. They have been
received for the purpose of describ-
ing and identifying premises which
were the scene of a crime: State
v. Ramos (1930) 159 Wash. 599,
294 Pac. 223; Elmendorf v. Com-
monwealth (1916) 171 Ky. 410, 188
S. W. 483. They have been ad-
mitted to show scenes taken several
months after the crime was com-
mitted where the condition of the
premises had not changed materi-
ally in the meantime: Hassell v.
State (1916) 80 Tex. Cr. R. 93, 188
S. W. 991. They have been allowed
as primary evidence of the identity
of persons alive or dead: Underhill
"Criminal Evidence" (3d. ed., 1923)
sec. 103. The principles underlying
the admissibility of photographs
have been applied to kindred inven-
tions, such as enlarged photographs,
photostats, X-Ray radiographs, skia-
graphs, moving pictures, and talk-
ing motion pictures: United States
v. Ortiz (1899) 176 U. S. 422, 44
L. Ed. 529 (magnified signature);
Kurzrok v. United States (1924) 1
F. (2d) 209 (photostats of false
revenue records); Chicago El. Co.
v. Spence (1904) 213 II. 220, 42
N. E. 796 (skiagraph of body);
Miller v. Minturn (1904) 73 Ark.
183, 83 S. W. 918 (radiograph of
injured ankle); Conmmonwealth v.
Roller (1930) 100 Pa. Super. Ct.
125 (talking motion pictures) ;
Wigmore "Moving Pictures in Evi-
dence" (1921) 15 Ill. L. Rev. 123.
As a general rule, photographs of
decedents are not admissible in evi-
dence where primarily they serve
no other purpose than to prejudice
the jury: State v. Miller (1903)
43 Ore. 325, 74 Pac. 658; 2 Wig-
more "Evidence'" (2d ed., 1923)
sec. 792. But they are admissible
in evidence to aid the jury in under-
standing the nature of mortal
wounds and the identity of the de-
ceased, though they may cause a
reaction against the accused beyond
the strict limits for which they were
admissible: Commonwealth v. Ret-
kovitz (1915) 222 Mass. 245, 110 N.
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E. 293; Commonwealth v. Winter
.(1927) 289 Pa. 284; 137 Ati. 261
(deceased children); Commonwealth
v. Sydlosky (1931) 305 Pa. 406, 158
Atl. 155 (murdered baby with hands
and feet cut off) ; State v. Eggleston
(1931) 161 Wash. 486, 297 Pac.
162 (wounds of deceased). Appar-
ently, therefore, the decision in the
instant case allowing photographs
of the wounds and of the entire
body of the deceased was in accord
with the authorities. It seems that
the defendant clearly was guilty of
murder in the second degree and
that the court believed the defendant
received the minimum sentence. As
a consequence, the court in affirm-
ing the conviction used the rule
that photographs introduced to iden-
tify the deceased and his wounds
are admissible even though they are
prejudicial incidentally. Were the
factual situation a border-line case
between murder and manslaughter,
the court could say with equal ease
that there was no question of the
identity of the deceased or his
wounds and that the only purpose
an introduction of photographs of
a mangled corpse could serve was
to prejudice the jury against the
accused. Fundamentally, the opera-
tion of these rules appears to be
another exemplification of the idea
that prejudicial error is largely de-
pendent upon the closeness of the
case. See Baker, "Reversible Error
in Homicide Cases" (1932) 23 Jour.
Crim. Law 28.
MAX J. BECKER.
